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Abstract
Russian media have recently (re-)gained attention of the scholarly community, mostly due to the rise of cyber-attacking
techniques and computational propaganda efforts. A revived conceptualization of the Russian media as a uniform system
driven by a well-coordinated propagandistic state effort, though having evidence thereunder, does not allow seeing the
public discussion inside Russia as a more diverse and multifaceted process. This is especially true for the Russian-language
mediated discussions online, which, in the recent years, have proven to be efficient enough in raising both social issues
and waves of political protest, including on-street spillovers. While, in the recent years, several attempts have been made
to demonstrate the complexity of the Russian media system at large, the content and structures of the Russian-language
online discussions remain seriously understudied. The thematic issue draws attention to various aspects of online public
discussions in Runet; it creates a perspective in studying Russian mediated communication at the level of Internet users.
The articles are selected in the way that they not only contribute to the systemic knowledge on the Russian media but also
add to the respective subdomains of media research, including the studies on social problem construction, news values,
political polarization, and affect in communication.
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1. Introduction
Russian media, and in particular their online segment,
have recently been (re-)instated as a focus of atten-
tion of communication scholars and computer scientists
(Howard, Kollanyi, Bradshaw, & Neudert, 2017; Sanovich,
2017). This was a result of several scandals around the
spread of various cyber-attacking techniques, such as
email hacking, attacks of socialmedia bots, and spread of
allegedly pre-paid electoral advertisements. These tech-
niques, in turn, have been repeatedly reported to have
been used for meddling into the US elections and gen-
eralized by the term ‘computational propaganda’. Com-
putational propaganda can be defined as ‘the assem-
blage of socialmedia platforms, autonomous agents, and
big data tasked with the manipulation of public opinion’
(Woolley & Howard, 2016, p. 4886).
Conceptualizing the Soviet (Communist), and later
the Russian media in terms of them acting as a uni-
form system driven by awell-coordinated propagandistic
state effort has been a long research tradition ever since
the early post-war period (Lasswell, 1951). Although
the ecosystem of the Soviet and later Russian media
has always been richer than that, it is this propagan-
distic aspect that has been most visible for the interna-
tional community, including the academe. A major rea-
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son for this is that propaganda may have—and some-
times does have—direct political effects on the interna-
tional, particularlyWestern arena, while other aspects of
the Russian media system are less influential and, there-
fore, less interesting.
The purpose of this thematic issue is to go beyond
the ‘computational propaganda’ studies and to draw at-
tention to a relatively narrow but important aspect of
the contemporary Russian media system—namely, to
the forms and content of discussions carried out by its
audience, or users. In the last decade, several schol-
arly attempts have been made to show the complexities
of the Russian media scene (Kiriya, 2019; Nigmatullina
& Bodrunova, 2018; Toepfl, 2011), including the on-
line media (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2016; Koltsova &
Shcherbak, 2015), but no sustainable effort has been
done to examine the nature of the Russian online pub-
lic discussions.
Propaganda-centered vision of a media system that
dates back to the times when the media in general were
much more unidirectional, does not leave any space
for channeling social feedback—either in media prac-
tice or in academic theorizing. Additionally, Soviet audi-
ences stayed under-researched due to their unavailabil-
ity forWestern scholars and local restrictions onmethod-
ologies and interpretations. Thus, there is hardly any
solid knowledge of how public discussions developed in
the Soviet countries at the interpersonal level and how
mass self-communication (Castells, 2007) via early In-
ternet means affected public agendas in the Russia of
the 1990s.
However, as new communication technologies have
changed the global media system, user-generated con-
tent (UGC) in non-oral forms has not only found a place
in nearly all societies but has already transcended its role
of feedback. That is, it has become not only reactive but
also pro-active, and has developed into a type of media
content per se. This content has become an integral part
of political life far beyond classical democratic societies.
UGC blends together social phenomena that were pre-
viously distinct: professional journalism, direct political
communication, amateur self-expression, inter-personal
communication, and public opinion—in the latter case,
hidden previously and now largely publicly available. It
has also become a mass mobilization tool distinct from
the previously known logics of organizations and move-
ments (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Diani, 2000).
Russia has not only absorbed all these new develop-
ments in media; it has participated in their formation
and has experienced a development of a vivid and, in a
way, unique Internet-based media system. Russia is, ar-
guably, the only country where national Internet compa-
nies have been more successful than their global com-
petitors nearly in all spheres of Internet business, in-
cluding search engines, mailing services, and social me-
dia. Unlike in China, where the closed Internet ecosys-
tem owes most of its success to the policy of techni-
cal, political, and economic isolation known as the Great
Chinese Firewall, Russian Internet industry has until re-
cently developed without any protectionist barriers. The
new, more protective policies are no more than a few
years old. At the same time, Russia is not isolated from
the rest of the world—in fact, it is more connected to
the world than any time in its history but in its own spe-
cific way.
Russian social media are dominated by the Russian
network VK.com (former VKontakte) that is far ahead of
all its competitors, especially in terms of activity, but also
in the absolute number of users. Facebook in Russia is a
niche network; however, it is preferred by politically ac-
tive citizens, especially by those with oppositional views
(Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2016; for suggestive evidence,
see Enikolopov, Makarin, & Petrova, 2018). But if the
politically relevant divisions between social media plat-
forms in Russia have at least gained some scholarly atten-
tion, the social representation, various aspects of digital
divide, and non-political issue-oriented discussions are
virtually absent from the view of academics.
Today, it is evident that the presence of foreign so-
cial networks in the Russian media landscape, as well as
Russian-speaking video bloggers, has started to cast im-
pact upon the state-owned and commercial ‘traditional’
media. The latter, rapidly losing young urban audience,
have to adapt their content and style to this audience
and to their views, to make the TV and newspaper con-
tent at least noticed. Likewise, Russian media aimed at
foreign audiences, such as Russia Today (RT), customize
their style of both news and opinion sections accord-
ing to their vision of international standards and to the
social-networking viral styles.
All these diverse types of media, including state-run,
maintain their accounts in social networks and permit
some form of comment sections there, or even host
them on their websites (Toepfl & Litvinenko, 2018), thus
becoming actors of the online deliberation. Unlike China,
Russia has shownno evidence of developing a large-scale
centralized censorship system involved in mass deletion
of user messages (which is useless, given the availabil-
ity of foreign social networks), although it has already
introduced a limited blocking of international (LinkedIn)
and Russian-language (Telegram) networking platforms.
At the same time, Russia is known for a well-developed
system of mass ‘pseudo-user’ content production. Com-
binedwith the activity of real users, this creates a specific
form of non-democratic discussion, similar to authoritar-
ian deliberation introduced by He and Warren (2011). In
the Chinese context for which this term has been initially
used, it means a set of institutions to articulate people’s
needs and later incorporate them into decision-making.
In Russia, UGC-based discussions per se are mostly used
for articulation of conflicting interests but, with growing
evidence, also for shaping protest activity, thus changing
the view towards Runet as ‘the web that failed’ (Fossato
& Lloyd, 2008).
While, on the one hand, possibilities of inclusion of
articulated grievances in Russia are limited, on the other
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hand, user content generates in a less isolated context
than in China. Users fromwithin and from outside Russia
can ‘cross-comment’ on the sources from outside their
countries of residence; they can interact, and even if they
are divided by language barriers they are aware of each
other’s agendas through multiple channels. Finally, they
can create agendas of their own using independent plat-
forms. Thus, a research focus on UGC and political/social
deliberationwithin it can bring to our attention a number
of previously under-researched aspects of the Russian
media. Furthermore, an in-depth research on specific dis-
cussions can produce results that contribute to a broader
media theory beyond both propaganda model and the
Russian context.
2. The Thematic Issue
Studies in UGC of the Russian social media are domi-
nated by examining its role in political protest and civil
activity (see, e.g., Goncharov & Nechay, 2018). This issue
collects articles that address other political aspects of
UGC, each with distinct empirical and theoretical focus.
Filatova, Kabanov and Misnikov (2019) directly ad-
dress the issue of authoritarian deliberation by com-
paring Russian user messages about food destruction
on both pro-government and independent platforms.
Food destruction—a measure taken by the Russian gov-
ernment against import of newly banned products—is
taken as an example of controversial counter-sanction
policy. The authors predictably find out that the pro-
portion of food destruction supporters is much higher
among commenters on the pro-government media plat-
forms. This conclusion is in line with earlier findings by
Goncharov and Nechay (2018) who find that social me-
dia users clearly fall into oppositional and loyalist clus-
ters. Even more interestingly, Filatova et al. (2019) exam-
ine the structure and the quality of deliberation on both
pro-government and independent platforms, comparing
such features as civility and validation. This contributes
to the studies of authoritarian deliberation that includes
spaces beyond control of the national political elites.
In a similar way, Koltsova & Nagorny (2019) exam-
ine reader comments in a space that, in theory, can
be fully controlled—that is, comment sections of re-
gional Russian newspapers. But, in fact, these are not
controlled. This leaves readers some room to re-define
the offered agendas, in particular, by problematizing
the issues that were unproblematic for (or were de-
problematized by) journalists. Moreover, issues reported
as single events get generalized by readers to the level of
social problems, sometimes in several competing ways.
The authors propose a number of metrics for these
phenomena and supplement them with qualitative text
analysis. This article contributes to the studies of social
problem construction and dynamic public opinion in non-
democratic contexts.
Echoing with Koltsova and Nagorny (2019), Judina
and Platonov (2019) go beyond showing the uneven dis-
tribution of commenting over topics and examine differ-
ent news features (such as exclusivity, presence of con-
flict or follow-up character) that influence the volume of
likes, comments, and reposts in news. Just like Filatova
et al. (2019), they compare pro-government and inde-
pendent Russianmedia. But, more importantly, they test
the applicability of Harcup andO’Neill’s (2016) taxonomy
of news values to the Russian context and provide the
critical analysis of this taxonomy, thus contributing to the
theory of news values.
Bodrunova, Blekanov, Smoliarova and Litvinenko
(2019), by studying Twitter user discussions on resonant
ethnic conflicts, bring Russian social media studies into
a comparative context that portraits Russian Twitter dis-
cussions against those in Germany and the US. Detailed
cross-country comparison of social media content, in
fact, rarely includes Russia (for a rare exception, see Filer
& Fredheim, 2016). It is this comparative approach that
allows the authors to contribute to the studies of politi-
cal polarization in social media. They show that, first, the
studied countries, despite their differences, share the
relatively high level of interaction between users with
different views, and, second, the divisions in all three
cases are not binary. These divisions are driven by na-
tional political contexts and transcend the traditional
left/right distinction.
Finally, Chatterje-Doody and Crilley (2019) study the
effects of the Russian social media beyond the Russian
audiences. Namely, they examine emotional reactions
of English-speaking users on Youtube videos about the
Syrian war featured by the Russian state channel RT. The
topic of this work is in line with the recent interest in
the Russian computational propaganda outlined above;
however, the authors develop an entirely different focus
on this issue. They build their analysis on the concept
of affective investment (Solomon, 2014)—roughly, a pro-
cess by which audiences relate themselves emotionally
with political discourses thus allowing those discourses
to resonate with their feelings and to exercise soft power.
The irony is that Solomon (2014) has developed his con-
cept to explain efficacy of American soft power and illus-
trated it with the examples from the US official discourse
on the war on terror. Chatterje-Doody and Crilley (2019),
however, do not compare Russia and the US explicitly—
rather, they offer a universal conceptual framework that
can explain, among other things, RT’s ability to resonate
with human emotions, but is widely applicable beyond
RT and Russia.
Overall, in all the studies collected in this thematic
issue, the focus on specific empirical problems going be-
yond the mainstream propaganda reasoning, allows for
placing the empirical findings in a wider context and
for explaining them by higher-level concepts not related
specifically to Russia. This allows each team of authors to
contribute to middle-range theories in their respective
sub-fields of media and communication research, and
those theories—to be enriched by empirical evidence
from a non-Western society.
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